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Introduction

Child welfare laws in the United States have evolved over time; however, one area of the
law that has been stymied is the application of modern United States welfare law in the context
of immigration proceedings. In the United States, immigration law and child welfare law
function in their own respective spheres. Currently, the United States relies on immigration law
to adjudicate immigration proceedings and turns a shoulder to child welfare laws, even if
children are involved in such proceedings. The United States federal government has provided
care for at least 5,000 children of immigrants, having deported or detained their parents.1 The
number is growing day by day. Between January and June of 2011, the United States deported
more than 46,000 parents of citizen children.2 This figure illustrates the importance the role of
children has in deportation proceedings that are taking place in the United States. Even more
disturbing is the fact that many of these children are citizens of the United States, indicating that
our immigration law fails to consider children and their best interests in this country’s
immigration practices.
Putting the problem into context, suppose that a citizen child is born to non-citizen
parents. When that child turns eight, his non-citizen parent becomes detained and determined to
be in the United States illegally. As a result, the parent becomes a detainee of the United States
and the child becomes a ward of the State until immigration proceedings are complete. If the
United States determines that the individual must be deported as a result of their illegal status, it
seems just and fair to then consider the status of the child. Generally in these proceedings, the
interests of the child are overlooked and immigration laws prevail. This result sends the parent to
their home country with the child, if the parent is fit. What about the child’s interest as a United

States citizen? The child has a right to grow in America and be given a democratic opportunity,
but has no avenue to express such interests.
United States law is too rigid regarding these matters; the law has yet to develop a proper
nexus between immigration law and child welfare law. Modern times call for a more flexible
approach to handling immigration proceedings involving children. The movement away from
parental rights and toward children’s autonomy suggests that the United States needs to
reevaluate and reconstruct the manner in which immigration proceedings involving children are
carried out. In order to find a reasonable solution we must 1) evaluate United States immigration
law; 2) evaluate United States child welfare law; and 3) find a compromise between each by
analyzing international standards.

Immigration Law in the United States

In the United States, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227 regulates the deportation of aliens and is the
primary statute explaining immigration removal proceedings. The section makes no reference to
a child’s interest nor in anyway denotes the use of United States welfare laws in determining an
alien’s child’s rights in deportation proceedings.3 Therefore, “under United States immigration
law, children who are accompanied by non-citizen parents who are directly affected by
immigration proceedings have no opportunity for their best interests to be considered.”4 In most
instances, the determination by the court to deport a non-citizen parent results in the child being
deported as well.5 Ultimately the choice lies with the parent(s) on whether to take the child with
them or leave the child behind.6
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United States immigration proceedings, however, do provide a means of escaping
deportation for non-citizens in violation of 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3),
deportation may be terminated when there is a threat to an alien’s life or freedom.7 Again, the
language used by the United States Congress fails to take into consideration any harm that may
threaten a parent’s child. Courts have routinely dismissed arguments made, in lieu of
§1231(b)(3), for the potential harm or threat to citizen children in a parent’s deportation
proceeding. There does remain an escape route for parents who believe their children may suffer
as a result of a deportation proceeding; however a rigorous standard must be satisfied. 8
U.S.C.A. § 1229b provides that the United States Attorney General may cancel removal of an
alien if: (1) the alien has resided in the United States for 5 or more years and has resided
continuously for at least 7 years; (2) the alien has good moral character; (3) the alien has no
convictions; and (4) removal will result in exceptional and extreme undue hardship to an alien’s
spouse, parent, or child who is a United States citizen.8 The exception illustrates consideration
for potential harms that may occur to a citizen child. But here, the statute dictates a burdening
standard calling for exceptional and extreme hardship.9
The Seventh Circuit in Sofinet v. INS, extended an exception to deportation when an alien
is able to demonstrate (1) the likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that irreparable harm will
occur if stay is denied; and (3) the potential harm to the movant outweighs the harm the INS will
suffer.10 Most of the cases involving an exception to deportation require some type of physical
persecution to oneself, meaning the alien must in fact be threatened. In these instances, it must be
more likely than not that an individual’s life or freedom would be threatened because of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a group or political opinion.11 The burden of proof is always
on the movant to demonstrate a clear probability that they will face some form of persecution.12
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Although the Court in Sofinet focused on physical persecution, the Sixth Circuit in Abay v.
Ashcroft has considered an element of psychological persecution. Psychological persecution
pertains to harm on a third party including an alien’s children.13 In Abay, the Court remanded
deportation extending the Sofinet standard to include psychological persecution.14 The Court in
Niang v. Gonzales, found that harm to a citizen child constitutes sufficient psychological harm
that extends to the child’s alien parent.15 Here, the court extended the per se rule, stating that
psychological harm cannot exist without the alien parent showing some form of accompanied
harm. 16 As a result, the possibility of persecution to a child is irrelevant absent a showing of
potential harm to the parent. Regarding similar circumstances, the Eighth Circuit has adopted the
position that derivative claims cannot be brought for fear of a child’s persecution. The Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits have taken the same stance. For example, the Fifth Circuit in Osigwe v.
Ashcroft held, that alien parents “were ineligible for asylum under the general asylum
provisions.”17 As for the Eleventh Circuit, the Court in Axmed v. Gonzales stated, “an alien
parent who has no legal standing to remain in the United States, may not establish a derivative
claim for asylum by pointing to the potential hardship of their American born children.”18 To
further demonstrate the disparity amongst the Circuits, although a decision was not issued, the
Ninth Circuit has shown movement toward the potential to protect children.19 In Abebe v.
Gonzales, the Court supported the possibility for granting relief on derivative claims in
remanding a case to consider the parent’s claim for asylum based on fear that their daughter
would be subject to persecution if deported.20
Although the Fourth and Sixth Circuits find psychological harm to a parent to derive
from potential harm to citizen children; the Fifth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuit’s limitations to
apply the standard to only physical persecution demonstrates that the circuits are split on the
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deportation exception.21 The Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Oforji v. Ashcroft furthers this split.
There the Court found that an alien couldn’t bring derivative claims based on a child(ren)’s
potential persecution to prevent deportation.22 There is a marked split amongst the Circuits that
must be resolved. There is a need for consensus when one Circuit considers a child’s interest and
another that fails to.23
The Courts, regardless of the standard they apply, recognize the unfortunate dilemma set
forth in immigration proceedings. For example, the Seventh Circuit acknowledges that nonrecognition of a child’s persecution may result in harm to that child, but is reluctant to allow
claims because Congress has yet to provide an avenue to seek relief [absent decisions by the
Attorney General to halt deportation].24 Congress has long taken the position that parental
interests outweigh those of children in an immigration proceeding.25 For instance, if a parent is
going to be deported, it is the parent(s) decision to take the child with them. Congress believes
this outweighs the State’s interest in protecting the citizen child and breaking up the family unit.
Courts realize that not all children are sufficiently represented in the immigration proceeding
context. The Courts understand that children’s interests are visible when parent’s take an interest
in the child and are seeking to protect the child as well as themselves. In this situation, Courts do
not typically see a need to evaluate a child’s separate interest because the parent(s) acts on behalf
of their child’s well being.26 A more concerning situation, in the Court’s opinion, is when a
child’s parent(s) fails to represent their child’s best interest.27 In a sense, the child becomes
invisible to the Court. It is this latter situation that beckons the need for a best interest of the
child analysis in immigration deportation cases.28
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Children’s Rights and Use of the Best Interest in Child Welfare Law

The discussion is this section refers to the application of child welfare laws to citizen
children and its potential to play a role in an alien parent’s immigration proceeding. The United
States welfare system has evolved into two overall considerations in its application of the law.29
One aspect focuses on the protection of parental rights; the other is maintaining the individual
rights of children.30
Older case law in the United States provides that parents once had the sole right to
control the upbringing of their children. In cases such as Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, the Supreme Court found that parental decisions are a liberty protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment.31 The opinions suggest that children are not "the mere creature[s] of the
state."32 These early decisions assume that parents tend to care for their children and make
decisions that benefit them.33 Further, the Courts found that there is an interest in maintaining
familial relationships by having parents as sole decision makers.34 The Court’s aspiration was to
prevent government intrusion into the privacy of the family unit. Court holdings that determine
parental decision-making is in the best interest of the child ignore the fact that in some cases
parents fail to consider their children’s best interest in the first place. Past Court decisions ere on
the assumption that parents will always protect their child’s interest, without requiring that they
actually do so.
The earlier Courts’ rulings allow for the interests of children to be ignored. These
decisions recognize the interest the State has in its citizen children. Although early Courts
focused on impeding government intrusion into the family, the impact was felt much further. In
Wisconsin v. Yoder, the decision to allow parents to have a right to teach their children sheds
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light on the idea that a child’s interest may not have been taken into consideration.35 Wisconsin v.
Yoder, however, did conclude that children did not have a right to choose their education, their
parents did. In this case the Court’s dissent noticed that by allowing parents, instead of State run
schools, to teach children lacks a guarantee of furthering the State’s interest in teaching
democratic values to its citizen children.36 The idea that allowing parents to teach what they wish
may run afoul of a State’s interest became an issue. Promoting the growth of children in their
understanding of democratic principles and disregarding a potential future interest in that child
neglects the State’s interest in ensuring that children are given an opportunity. The State has an
obligation to allow children to be able to develop in a society where democratic principles are
prevalent. The State takes an interest in the growth of its citizens and children being raised in an
unfit matter. This revelation has opened the door to a modern stance in child welfare law,
focusing on the second consideration in welfare law; the child’s interest.
The movement towards granting children’s rights developed after the decision in
Wisconsin v. Yoder. The idea that parental control could be a form of oppression began to
emerge. Generally, a child does have a right to be free from adult control that does not serve their
interest. The State has a role in furthering this principle by protecting children, specifically
citizen children.37 Children’s rights soon included protection rights, right to be free from harm,
rights to autonomy which results in the ability for one to have the right to make choice’s
regarding their own life.38 In a movement away from old case law, the Court in Prince v.
Massachusetts held that the State has an interest in the health and future of its citizen children.39
As noted above, the State has an interest in teaching children the fundamental values of a
democratic society.40 In Bethel v. Fraser, the Court notes the importance of school in its role in
teaching children values essential for “citizenship in the Republic.”41 Further, in Mozert v.
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Hawkins County Board Of Education the Court states that exposing children to liberal values and
ideas are necessary for their future role as citizens.42 The Court in Mozert objected to parent’s
disagreement with certain philosophies taught in a public school.43 The Court reasoned that not
only would supporting the parent’s rights be harmful to the children, but also to the State.44
The State’s prevailing interest in these contexts is that children become functioning
members of a democratic society by instilling in them the principles that make such a society.45
The idea of exposing children to diverse views is a means of ensuring that children become full
citizens capable of interacting in a social, cultural and political context.46 In this same light, it has
been argued that providing citizen children with these rights benefits the State as well.
Progressive reformers suggest children’s duties are no longer obedience to parents, but instead
preparation for citizenship. Citizenship, based on teaching of liberty and democratic principles,
gives growth to our democracy. Progressives go as far as to argue that survival of the nation rests
on the rights of children to be taught in a manner, which makes them functioning citizens of our
society.47 The Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education explained that segregation
undermined “the very foundation of good citizenship… and denial of educational opportunities
denies children the tools necessary for their future role as citizens”.48 In a more recent case,
Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court emphasized the importance of educational opportunities as critical
in “sustaining our political and cultural heritage”.49
Citizen children born to alien parents may never be given such an opportunity absent a
consideration of their best interests. In the cases mentioned, the Courts were determining welfare
issues in the context of a citizen family. The reasoning set forth by the Courts above is absent in
immigration proceedings involving alien parents and citizen children. It is not a matter of
discussion because a child’s interest is never at stake when an immigration court is deciding
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whether or not to deport a parent. In these matters, the parents are the ultimate deciders of
whether their children will remain with them or stay in the United States. It is time that the
immigration courts maintain the State’s interest in a child’s connection to America.
In Nguyen v. INS, the court upheld the constitutionality of an immigration statute that
confers citizenship on foreign children born to American mothers.50 Why would the State
consider the interests of a non-citizen child’s connection to America more than its own citizen
children? The system lacks coherence on this matter. Assuming that a maternal connection is so
strong, the Court in Nguyen provides citizenship to children born to American mothers.51 It
would only seem fair to maintain this connection between citizen children and their alien
mothers if the goals of our government are to instill democratic values in children in lieu of what
their parent’s aspirations are.52 “The State must guard not only [children’s] current liberty, but
also their future liberty. It thus must deny all others, including parents, the right to deprive their
young either of their basic liberty during immaturity, or their ability to develop the capacity to
exercise their future liberty.”53
It is clear that there is a conflict between parental and child’s rights in the welfare
context. Citizen children, regardless of a parent’s status, are an interest of the State when the
parent is unfit. In a deportation instance, when a parent is found to be fit or unfit the child is
generally taken as a ward of the State because of their citizen status and the alien status of their
parent. Ultimately the State has an interest in reunification in this context, absent some other
showing of unfitness. Reunification preserves the family unit, which the State assumes is in the
interest of both the parent and child. Children are dependent on their parents and many times
reunification ensures that they can remain dependent until adulthood.54 A compelling reason in
which the State supports reunification is that the State does not want to impede on family
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relations. Too much State involvement, although it may provide independence for the child, may
in fact deter the independence of the family as a whole and their ability to make sound decisions.
Courts do recognize the position they are placed in when deciding to reunite a family.
Many times deportation of a fit parent results in a child being sent to a poorer and less developed
county. Although the State shows an interest [in domestic welfare cases] of ensuring that a child
is raised on democratic principles; they fail to go as far as to divide a family when a parent is
being deported to a country that will never provide an American child with these teachings.55
Courts generally support reunification, but have determined that sending a child to harm’s way
may reason to keep children from their parents. The Court determined in Olowo v. Ashcroft, that
reunification was not proper when an alien mother intended to return to Nigeria with her child
because the child was possibly going to suffer female genital mutilation in that country.56 This
case illustrates the major complications involving immigration proceedings. If the child was not
under the State’s welfare system, the mother would have taken the child and likely not spoke of
the child’s interest against persecution in Nigeria. Here, the interest of the child was considered
in light of the mother’s failure to object to the harm that would have occurred if she had been
deported.57 Immigration proceedings lack any insight into the child’s interest, absent a case like
Olowo, when a child that is taken and spoken for by the State.

Policy Considerations In Examining A Child’s Best Interest

Reunification is the most prevalent result in immigration proceedings. However, the
Olowo case sheds light on the importance of considering a child’s well being when determining
whether to allow their parents to make all decisions and speak on their child’s behalf.58 In the
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context of recognizing a child’s interest, there are important policy considerations that must be
taken into account. First and foremost is inquiring about the child’s current and future health.59
As was the case in Olowo, the child’s future health was in question if they ended up reunited
with their mother and sent to Nigeria.60 Physical health is a consideration that becomes apparent
in analyzing the facts of each case, however a more elusive health factor is the impact on a
child’s mental health. Determining which is less detrimental to the mental health of a child is
difficult task to assign to a judge deciding whether to deport an alien parent. What has less of a
negative impact on the child; separation, deportation to a less developed country, or being raised
under the State’s welfare system? Furthermore, the developmental heath of the child is also at
issue. Is growing up separated from their parent more beneficial to development than being
raised in a country where poverty and low literacy rates prevail? These considerations must be
made on a case by case basis, but the number of factors that must be taken into account show that
a child’s interest are important and should matter in determining whether to deport an alien
parent and allow their child to follow that same path.
Another policy matter that plays a key role in this context is jus soli.61 Jus soli is applied
in American law and confers automatic citizenship on children who are born on United States
soil despite a parent’s undocumented or alien status.62 This doctrine places Courts in the
predicament of occasionally abandoning American citizens when parents must be deported. If,
for policy matters we eliminate this practice, the issue of determining whether or not to keep
citizen children in the United States or allow them to reunite with their parents becomes moot.
Children would be assumed to be the citizenship of their parents and determinations to reunite
would not be necessary because the issue of protecting the State interest in citizens would be
non-existent.
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Reconsideration of jus soli has garnered much attention over the recent years. The
increase of illegal immigrants entering the United States to give birth to “anchor babies” has
become a major problem.63 The term, “anchor baby”, describes a child born on American soil,
which upon reaching the age of twenty-one can sponsor the immigration of family.64 The child
serves as the anchor in order to achieve the purpose of admitting family to the United States
based on his jus soli citizenship.65 Suggestions to reform jus soli citizenship include amending
birth right citizenship to only include children born to citizen parents.66 This change could be
remarkably influential in cases regarding deportation. Consideration, in this context, would no
longer have to be given to children born of alien parents. It would simplify proceedings, only
needing to consider the parents’ deportation status. The State would no longer retain an interest
in an alien’s child because law would no longer deem them a citizen; they would lose it at birth
because of their parent’s non-citizen status. A policy change would in a sense create a United
States born “alien” status that would receive no rights of an American citizen although they were
born here. There are large implications of implementing a policy of this nature. A classification
of this sort would apply predominantly to immigrant mothers of a minority race, raising the
possibility of racial discrimination issues.67 On the other end of the spectrum, the handling of
immigration deportation proceedings become more just as applied to children. Use of the best
interest standard and determining whether to break up a family would not need to be considered,
making judgments less harsh. However, there does exist an immigrant who retains asylum in the
United States seeking a better way of life for their children and relies on jus soli to ensure that
their children are granted American citizenship. Does the United States government have an
obligation to those that seek to live in a democratic society? For a nation founded on liberty and
freedom a drastic change to jus soli may be unjust and run against the foundations of our nation.
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A policy change of this sort would be a drastic change and one that does not seem plausible.
Becoming an American citizen is a wish many seek to have fulfilled and eliminating jus soli
would seem contrary to protecting the integrity of American citizenship. The effects would likely
give rise to other citizenship issues and create more problems. The positive impact would only
apply to a miniscule portion of immigration law.
The lack of considering a child’s best interest in immigration proceedings generally
occurs in situations unlike that of Owolo.68 Many cases involve children who are never a ward of
the State, whom don’t have the State to speak on their behalf. Our judicial system must find a
medium in this realm of the law. A nexus that considers both the child and the interest of the
State in deporting illegal aliens must be found. In order to find an appropriate resolution, insight
must be taken from positions taken around the world regarding children in immigration
proceedings. In order to create a more reasonable system in the United States, our government
needs to integrate these international principles into the way immigration proceedings are
handled at home.

Attempting to Find A Sensible Solution

There must be a change in the way immigration proceedings handle children and their
interests in the United States. Application of a best interest of the child standard used in United
States welfare cases must be used when courts are deciding whether or not to deport an alien
with citizen children. Conclusions drawn from above indicate that there is currently a split
amongst the Courts on whether to consider a child’s interest. Some Courts are willing to hear
derivative claims on the basis of harm to children during deportation, while others are not. In
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America, no child’s interest is given consideration [absent a parent’s interest of that child] in
deportation cases where no apparent harm exists.69
Examining international law provides insight into how these situations are handled in a
more reasonable and sensible matter. The Convention on the Rights of the Child was formed to
ensure that children are protected under humanitarian, human rights, and refugee law.70 The
Convention was developed by the standards set forth in the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of the Child which introduced the idea that, “the best interests of the child shall be the
paramount consideration.”71 The Convention states, “No child shall be deprived of his or her
liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily.”72 Further the Convention seeks to protect a child’s right to: (1)
physical and legal protection; (2) remain united with their parent(s); (3) care and assistance of
developmental needs; (4) participate in decisions regarding their future; (5) means of
reunification. The protections the Convention seeks to achieve are the basic principles that need
to be examined when deciding the fate of children in a United States’ immigration proceeding.73
These factors help to provide a basic framework to allow Courts to make appropriate decisions
with the interests of children in mind. However, the United States has failed to ratify the
Convention and thus has no obligation under customary international law to abide by them.
Perhaps it is time for the United States to take a stance in protecting not only children’s interest;
but also children who are citizen’s interest as well.74 The United States reluctance to ratify this
treaty suggests that the United States is more concerned with relocating children without first
analyzing a child’s rights. The United States considers children in the context of nonimmigration matters, but has yet to show any movement toward applying the standard any
further.
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The United States should apply these standards in welfare matters because they did sign
onto the Convention, which sets forth, “in all actions concerning children whether undertaken by
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative
bodies, the best interest of the child shall be primary consideration.”75 A plain reading of this
principle infers that the United States, as a signatory, has an obligation to protect the interests of
children taken under the State’s welfare system, however there is no mention that a citizen of the
nation must be protected when their parents are being deported. Because the child is not a ward
of the State and the parents interest reign supreme in an immigration context, the United States
does not need to oblige to these international standards. However, these principles should be read
as universal and applying to any situation involving children. The adoption of these principles by
the Convention on the Right of the Child indicates that the best interest standard is more
universal than the United Nations intended. The United States reluctance to ratify the Convention
demonstrates their ignorance of international standards and turning a cold shoulder to the
interests of citizen children during immigration proceedings.
Direct application of these principles is demonstrated in Canadian law.76 In Canada, the
best interest of the child approach is incorporated in its immigration proceedings. The United
States and Canada have similar immigration history and have immigration systems that resemble
one another. Protection under the Canadian best interest approach should be paralleled in United
States immigration proceedings. In addition to considering the principles set forth in protecting a
child’s rights, Canada goes one step further in providing a child with a best interests
representative.77 The representative acts on behalf of the child in an immigration proceeding
involving an alien parent.78 In Canada, an alien can request permanent residency through a
humanitarian and compassionate relief application.79 When the request is reviewed the decision-
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makers must take into consideration “the best interests of the child directly affected.”80 This
process has provided a standard to which courts in Canada apply the best interest approach.81
Courts in Canada consider the benefit to the child of the parent’s deportation from Canada as
well as the hardship the child may suffer from their parent’s removal or their departure to the
parent’s domicile.82 Applying the Canadian model in United States can address many of the
difficult issues in the cases that were earlier discussed. Appointment of a representative
eliminates the problem of a child’s rights being invisible when a parent fails to represent their
child’s interests. In addition, it provides access to be heard in proceedings where the child
generally would have no input into the court’s determinations.83 The Canadian system enables
children to have a voice and to have their interests heard. It takes into consideration the
developmental interests of the child, the parent’s expectations, as well as the State’s interest in
protecting its citizens. An attempt to mirror the Canadian system has been developed as an
advocacy project in the United States. The Immigrant Children’s Advocacy Project has been
established to provide children with guardian ad litem.84 The mission of the Project is to
“identify and give voice to the child best interests while he or she is subject to an immigration
proceeding.”85 Although not all children are represented in their parent’s proceedings, the
establishment of a program of this kind demonstrates the need to recognize the interest of
children in an immigration setting. The advocates of this program act as a liaison in the legal
system, meeting with the child at least once per week helping the child understand the process
and explaining the consequences of the decisions that will be made.86
In order to effectively implement a more just policy concerning children in the United
States, the international standards above should be used as a guiding tool. In addition, one way to
correct the problem would be through the actions of the legislature. Modifying the immigration
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exceptions is a means in which Congress could better protect non-citizen parents and their
children. Decreasing the minimum number of years necessary to be in the country as well as
lessening the “extreme hardship” standard will allow parents to be given the opportunity to
remain in the country and allow their children to be provided the opportunities they deserve as
citizens of the United States. Further, Congressional attempts to pursue the ratification of the
Convention on the Rights of Children may work in persuading the executive to ratify and
implement the standards set forth therein. Ratification would oblige the United States to follow
the standards set forth in the Convention and ensure that children’s rights are considered not only
in all welfare matters but in immigration proceedings as well.
Another avenue that should be given high regard is paralleling the procedures undertaken
by Canada. Permitting or assigning a representative to serve the interest of children would ease
many of the issues with the representation of a child. A means of establishing a resource such as
the Immigrant Children’s Advocacy Project will provide ample opportunity for children’s
interests to be expressed.87 In addition, advocates serve a child’s interest by taking consideration
such things as foster care (if needed), educational services, legal services (beyond the
immigration context), therapeutic services, medical care, religious support, nutritional well
being, access to communication networks, access to interpreters and recreational programs; to
name a few.88 In effect, the program exceeds representing a child’s best interest. Perhaps
implementing this amount of guidance would be too burdensome in its initial establishment, but
the Project serves as a positive guide towards a better approach to handling children’s interest in
immigration proceedings in the United States. The pilot project can help pave the way for future
programs that can be created for citizen children whose parents are in the middle of an
immigration proceeding. Although the State takes an interest in its citizens in welfare

16

proceedings, it lacks when a fit parent is being deported. Providing a guardian ad litem program
would fill the gap necessary to protect a child’s rights in this setting.
The prevailing idea of reunification runs supreme to the voice of a child’s interest in the
courtroom. Providing a child with independent legal counsel allows for that representative to
serve and openly voice the interest of that child. It is a sufficient means of providing the court
with reasons on why a child should not be deported in light of their parent’s deportation. Instead
of allowing a parent to speak on behalf of the child’s interest, the direct interests of the child can
be expressed and developed in front of a court, which must determine the fate of that child. The
application of the best interest standard should be applied in both the welfare and immigration
context. Applying the standard maintains that a citizen child’s rights remain intact and ultimately
maintains the idea of familial unification.
The entire system needs to be revamped. Instead of having two distinct areas of law,
there could be developed a hybrid system in the context of immigration proceedings involving
citizen children; an immigration welfare court. A system of this nature provides courts the ability
to take into consideration all the parties affected by an immigration proceeding. By paving a new
avenue for proceedings to be heard, the establishment of case law and bright line rules regarding
families and immigration proceedings can be developed. This would ensure a structured manner
of achieving the goals and interest of the State, parents, and children. However, the policy
concerns surrounding setting up a new court would be a major issue. There lacks a precedential
resort to rely on in both establishing the court and administering its decisions. Administratively,
issues would arise from the logistical tasks of establishing such a system. In addition, the
feasibility of setting up proceedings of this nature would be a major problem. The fact that the
system could provide an avenue for fraud is a real threat. If children’s interests must always be
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considered then the reason for aliens to procreate for their benefit would likely occur. This would
be in direct conflict with the reasons why establishing such a system are necessary. The potential
issues that arise appear to heavily outweigh the establishment of a new means of handling
immigration proceedings. It is more sensible to find a middle ground in established case law and
correct our current system rather than create a new way of dealing with immigration affairs
involving children.

Conclusion

The United States’ separation of immigration proceedings and child welfare systems has
led to the abandonment of citizen children’s rights. The archaic system neglects children who
may suffer deportation as a result of their parent’s status in the country. Although children’s
interest are generally considered by their parents, the inability of a child to express their rights
and interests are lost in the current way the United States handles immigration proceedings. The
current split amongst the Circuits indicates that the system needs to be reevaluated.
The strict rules that are followed in the immigration courts do not parallel the best
interests standards used when children are considered in the welfare context. Although many
children in immigration proceedings are citizens, they are not provided the same opportunities
that citizen children receive when there is a welfare offense involving a citizen parent. As a
result, the entire system needs to be integrated and developed in accordance to principles set
forth internationally. By examining both the Convention on the Rights of the Child and practices
in Canada, the United States can reform immigration proceedings to be handled in way that
provides children a voice.89 Implementing a system that allows children’s interests to be heard
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helps to achieve the goals of the State. It will provide an avenue to determine whether it is in the
best interest of the child to remain at home and be given the rights of an American citizen to
grow under democratic values, or whether it is proper to deport children because it is in their
interest to remain with their parents. The system can be reformed and it is time for a change, a
child’s voice although soft can have a huge impact on how their life pans out.
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